Cross-national partisan effects on agenda stability by Bevan, Shaun & Greene, Zachary
Bevan, Shaun and Greene, Zachary (2017) Cross-national partisan 
effects on agenda stability. Journal of European Public Policy. ISSN 
1350-1763 , http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1268641
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/58919/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
1 
 
Cross-National Partisan Effects on Agenda Stability  
Shaun Bevan and Zachary Greene 
 
ABSTRACT 
Studies of policy attention find only mixed support for a partisan impact, instead showing that 
policy attention reacts more to world events. Yet, a rigorous examination of the ways in which 
change in the partisan composition of government matters for the distribution of policies across 
issues has yet to be completed in a cross-national framework. Combining data on policy output 
from the Comparative Agendas ProjectZHSUHVHQWDGHWDLOHGLQYHVWLJDWLRQRISDUWLHV¶HIIHFWRQ
agenda stability in six advanced industrial democracies over time. We consider parties as 
dynamic organizations by arguing that pDUWLHV¶RUJDQL]DWLRQDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDQGJRDOVinteract 
with their electoral context to determine their impact on policy attention. The results show that 
SDUWLHV¶LQIOXHQFHRQWKHSROLF\DJHQGDGHSHQGVRQeconomic conditions, the type of government, 
WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶Vseat share, and the number of parties in the governing cabinet, particularly 
following a major transition in government.   
 
Keywords: agenda-setting, coalition politics, issue attention, political parties, policy 
accountability, policy change 
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How do political parties influence the issues addressed by public policy? The general 
consensus is that parties affect a range of political outcomes. Yet, this research leaves how and 
why parties matter unclear. Renewed interest in parties by public policy research has shown the 
most common way of accounting for them in statistical models, the use of dummy variables to 
look for broad, party based differences in the dependent variable, leads to, at best, mixed results 
(e.g. Baumgartner et al. 2009; John et al. 2014). Indeed, WKHSDUWLHV¶OLWHUDWXUHLWVHOILVQRW
immune to the shortcomings of overly rough measures (e.g. Hibbs 1977) to represent what are 
ultimately complex and dynamic actors (Strøm 1990). Furthermore, this approach cannot address 
the broad political context such as changing economic conditions or coalition governance 
structures. 
We build on this research to argue that SDUWLHV¶LQIOXHQFHRQpolicies depends on 
attributes such as their ideology and ability to maintain cohesion and their strategic context (see 
Budge et al. 2010; Bevan and Greene 2016). As studies of economic voting and party strategy 
suggest (Whitten and Palmer 1999; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Hellwig 2012; Greene 
2016a; Williams et al 2016), contextual factors such as the state of the economy have broad 
HIIHFWVRQSDUWLHV¶PRWLYDWLRQVWRLPSOement policy. We argue that the factors influencing 
SDUWLHV¶SDUOLDPHQWDU\FDSDELOLWLHVDQGLQFHQWLYHVIRUSROLF\FKDQJHKDYHWKHJUHDWHVWHIIHFWRQ
the policy agendai following a major transition in the partisan control of government. This focus 
allows us to isolate the effects of the governing context on parties when differences between 
governments are most likely to occur. We develop a series of hypotheses that consider the effect 
of the politicaOFRQWH[WRQSDUWLHV¶PRWLYDWLRQVDQGDELOLW\WRLQIOXHQFHpolicy based on studies of 
party election strategies and government behavior both following and in between partisan 
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transitions in government. 7KHVHK\SRWKHVHVDFFRXQWIRUSDUWLHV¶LQFHQWLYHVWRFKDQJHLVVXHV
addressed by public policy and the constraints imposed by partisan and institutional context. 
We focus our investigation on public policy, specifically, issue attention, where the exact 
effect of parties remains open for debate (Wlezien and Soroka 2010; Bevan and Greene 2016), 
despite the fundamental importance of agenda-setting in the policy-making process 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Scholars demonstrate mixed evidence of partisan effects on 
individual issues or policies (e.g. healthcare ± Tsebelis 2002; compliance with international 
treaties ± Jensen and Spoon 2011) and government budgets (Wlezien and Soroka 2010), but have 
\HWWRH[SORUHSDUWLHV¶UROHLn the broader distribution of issues addressed by government. Using 
data on primary legislation from six Comparative Agendas Project (CAP; 
www.comparativeagendas.net) countries, we consider how SDUWLHV¶traits and their context affect 
the stability of legislative agendas from a measure introduced by Mortensen et al. (2011). This 
measure aggregates differences in attention issue by issue through an overall index of stability in 
attention from year to year.ii We develop a new measure of partisan transition that accounts for 
whole sale change in government and more subtle changes in parties¶FRDOLWLRQ participation. We 
conduct analyses using time series cross-sectional methods aimed at pinpointing party influence 
from differences in party traits and contexts. 
Understanding how and when the content of an agenda changes is at the heart of policy-
making research. Our framework allows us to begin testing theories of policy change and 
democratic accountability that provides a more general approach than past case studies or single 
issue focused analyses. This approach builds on similar work focused on understanding 
aggregate patterns of issue attention through correlational and diversity based analyses 
(Baumgartner et al. 2009; Jennings et al. 2011; Boydstun et al. 2014). The results show that 
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SDUWLHV¶LQIOXHQFHRQWKHSROLF\DJHQGDGHSHQGVRQJRYHUQPHQW type, the gRYHUQPHQW¶Vgeneral 
ability to influence legislation and the economy following a major transition in government. 
Collectively, we offer evidence that the incentives and constraints placed on the partisan content 
of governments influence the distribution of policies they pursue.  
 
Still Looking for the Party? Partisan Influence and Agenda Stability 
6FKRODUVKDYHORQJVRXJKWWROLQNSXEOLFSROLF\DQGSROLF\RXWFRPHVZLWKSDUWLHV¶LVVXH
priorities and preferences. Despite substantial effort, research likely misses SDUWLHV¶LQIOXHQFH
when they rely on overly broad indicators for parties. Parties are diverse organizations that 
UHVSRQGWRFKDQJHVLQSROLWLFDOFRQWH[W$VRUJDQL]DWLRQVSDUWLHV¶SULRULWLHVDUHOLNHO\PRUHIOXLG
than traditional accounts assume. We propose WKDWSDUWLHV¶HYROYLQJFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDQGUROHV
within the governing process lead to consistent partisan based policy revisions to the governing 
agenda. While the largest differences between parties emerge immediately following complete 
transitions in power, we also expect subtle intra-election differences.  
Party leaders face competing incentives to achieve goals for winning elections and 
developing policy (StrøP$GDPV6SRRQ)RUH[DPSOHSDUWLHV¶FDPSDLJQ
messages reflect incentives for leaders to selectively emphasize issues, change the relative 
location of their preferences or present ambiguous policy statements (Adams et al. 2005; Meguid 
2008; Somer-Topcu 2009; 2015; de Vries and Hobolt 2012; Schumacher et al. 2013; Abou-
Chadi and Orlowski 2016). However, parties are often assumed to pursue strategic or selectively 
emphasized issues once they take office to avoid a reputation of acting unaccountably (Adams 
1999; Carey 2009). Indeed, Jensen and Spoon (2011) show that governing pDUWLHV¶SRVLWLRQVeven 
influence policy compliance with international environmental agreements such as the Kyoto 
protocol.  
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Economic conditions and SXEOLFRSLQLRQSURYLGHEURDGLQGLFDWRUVRISDUWLHV¶IXWXUH
success (Adams et al. 2009; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Williams et al. 2016). Voters regularly 
punish or reward parties for economic performance (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). Fearing 
YRWHUV¶UHWULEXWLRQJRYHUQLQJSDUWLHVIRFXVWKHLUDWWHQWLRQWRIL[LQJDSRRUHFRQRP\*LYHQ
YRWHUV¶UHOLDQFHRQHFRQRPLF FRQGLWLRQVDVDVKRUWKDQGIRUSDUWLHV¶FRPSHtencies (Green and 
Jennings 2012a; 2012b), parties avoiding an appearance of incompetence will change their 
policy messages (Hellwig 2012; Greene 2016a; Williams et al. 2016) and presumably policy 
behavior (Bevan and Greene 2016) under a weak economy. Negative conditions clearly place 
strong incentives for governing parties to focus on fixing the economy. A government that does 
nothing to respond to these conditions will appear irresponsible and broadly incompetent, 
particularly when they have been in office for some time.  
Our hypotheses distinguish years with a partisan transition, when a new party or set of 
parties take control of government, and years without a transition, where the same party or 
coalition maintains control. We focus our first hypothesis on the role of the economy when the 
same government remains in power contending that positive economic conditions free parties to 
diversify their agendas. A government with a growing economy will turn attention to alternate 
topics as voters are  broadly content with the JRYHUQPHQW¶Vpolicies (Green and Jennings 2012a; 
2012b). This discussion has implications for the issues that governments address based on the 
incentives the economy places on parties to appear accountable and competent. With a declining 
economy, agenda stability will increase DVSDUWLHV¶FKDQJHWKHLUDWWHQWLRQIURPIRFXVLQJRQmore 
diverse priorities to repairing the economy. Conversely, a growing economy is broadly requisite 
to focus on alternate policy priorities. As the rate of economic growth picks up steam governing 
parties expand their policy activities, decreasing agenda stability.iii This argument follows from 
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UHODWHGILQGLQJVRQWKHHIIHFWRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VHFRQRPLFIRFXVRQWKHDELOLW\Wo attend to other 
issues (Jennings et al. 2011) and is consistent with Green-PederseQDQG0RUWHQVHQ¶V
finding that parties respond to economic conditions in office. Our first hypothesizes summaries 
this perspective. 
 
H1a) A strong economy decreases agenda stability during non-transition years. 
 
The economy strongly predicts partisan transitions cross-nationally (Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier 2000). Differences in ideological prescriptions for an ailing economy lead new 
governments to radically shift parliament¶VSROLF\DWWHQWLRQ based on their proposed agenda. For 
example, a socialist party facing a poor economy might focus its prescriptions for slow growth 
on increasing the social safety net or wages (Hibbs 1977). A conservative government might 
instead focus on the efficiency of government operations or facilitating  small business growth. 
This policy shift would only register the session immediately following a partisan transition; the 
new government would dedicate resources to its policy prescription until the economy improves. 
However, when partisan transitions occur during times of economic prosperity (Powell and 
Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999; Hellwig 2012) incentives for a new government to 
change policy are far weaker. This logic leads us to hypothesize that partisan transitions in power 
moderate the effect of economic conditions.  
 
H1b)  A strong economy increases agenda stability following a partisan transition. 
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Institutions and multi-SDUW\JRYHUQDQFHFRQVWUDLQSDUWLHV¶DELOLWLHV to control policy. 
While procedural rules allow leaders to maintain parliamentary XQLW\SDUWLHV¶SROLF\control 
depends on their need to build coalitions and internal cohesion (Huber and 1996; Döring 2001 
and 2003; Tsebelis 2002; %UनXQLQJHU and Debus 2009). Although governing cabinets in 
parliaments rarely lose legislative votes (Huber 1996; Döring 2003), the observance of 
SDUOLDPHQWDU\GLVFLSOLQHGRHVQRWPHDQWKDWSDUWLHV¶03VKROGFRKHVLYHSUHIHUHQFHVRUKDYHlittle 
influence on parliamentary acts. Indeed, MPs also have a range of tools to register their 
GLVVDWLVIDFWLRQZLWKSDUOLDPHQWDU\OHDGHUV'|ULQJ2¶%ULHQDQG6KRPHU
Parliamentary leaders with procedures at their disposal to maintain party unity (e.g. vote of 
confidence, the Guillotine, vote bloqué), should easily be able to maintain strong control over the 
SDUOLDPHQW¶Vvoting behavior (Döring 2001, 2003; Bevan et al. 2011). 
Despite high levels of observed discipline across the parliamentary world, intra-party 
politics influences SDUWLHV¶SROLF\EHKDYLRU)RUZDUGORRNLQJ03VDQGLQWUD-party factions know 
that parliamentary leaders have numerous tools to ensure a policy outcome. Intra-party groups, 
however, constrain leaders outside of the parliamentary arena by supporting intra-party 
leadership competitors (Ceron 2015; Greene and Haber 2016) or even switching to or forming a 
QHZSDUW\2¶%ULHQDQG6KRPHU 
Therefore, the appearance of parliamentary discipline may mask serious disagreements 
over the relative location or issue priorities of a party. Policy agreements are often compromises 
debated privately between members of the same parliamentary group and individual MPs 
regularly work for individual interests and factions (Thomassen and Andeweg 2004; Budge et al. 
2010). Governing party leaders with a large majority likely play intra-party factions and groups 
against each other to achieve their desired outcome (e.g. the problem of competing principals - 
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Carey 2009). Governments with more dominant majorities can even allow public observation of 
intra-party disagreement without fear of losing important legislative votes. British back bench 
rebellions or the French vote bloqué allow MPs to distinguish their preferences from the 
leadership without causing parliamentary defeat (e.g. Huber 1996). However, parliamentary 
leaders with a small majority must ensure that no intra-party group abandons the party at a key 
moment. To keep intra-party groups from defecting, small parliamentary majorities require 
greater intra-party log rolls or policy bargains.  
Theories of parliamentary discipline indicate a similar impact of majority size (Cox and 
McCubbins 1994; Cox 2000), but offer few predictions for the issues addressed by parliamentary 
votes. Parliamentary procedures allocate legislative powers to the prime minister (Cox 1987; 
Döring 2001; 2003). While legislative powers are strong, most procedures ultimately require 
parliamentary votes. Yet, few MPs would risk losing control of government over disagreements 
on a single act. 
This logic leads us to hypothesize that larger majorities enable party leaders to maintain a 
more stable policy agenda. Parliamentary leaders with a large majority have a greater number of 
intra-governmental options to coordinate a majority of MPs for specific policies. These 
negotiations likely happen at the coalition or party level(s) and will not openly appear on votes in 
parliaments with strong discipline. Governments seek to maintain an image of unity and avoid 
public divisions (Ceron 2015; Greene and Haber 2016). Leaders can also use parliamentary 
SURFHGXUHVWROLPLWGLYLVLRQVWKDWPLJKWGDPDJHJRYHUQPHQWSDUWLHV¶IXWXUHHOHFWRUDOVXFFHVV
&R[3DUWLHVDOORZµIUHHYRWHV¶SURYLGLQJQRGLUHFWLRQRQKRZ03VVKRXOGYRWHRQ
legislation that they are divided on or that they consider unimportant. Smaller legislative 
PDMRULWLHVIDFHJUHDWHUULVNVIURPDQ\LQGLYLGXDOPHPEHUGHIHFWLQJ2¶%ULHQDQG6KRPHU
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Therefore, we predict that a small parliamentary majority incentivizes party leaders to initiate 
greater log rolls across issues. 
 
H2a) A government controlling a larger percentage of seats increases agenda stability 
during non-transition years.  
 
  Agenda stability can be caused by a government content to maintain the status quo or one 
incapable of altering it. Minority governments, for example, only pass policies with assistance 
from non-government parties. Like divided governments in presidential systems, minority 
governments cannot unilaterally revise the policy agenda (Laver 1999). The government must 
negotiate with other parties to legislate. While parties may work with ideologically close parties 
to negotiate policies (Huber 1996), a minority¶V ability to drastically change the agenda is 
limited. Their largest power is control of legislative pURFHGXUHVRIWHQUHIHUUHGWRDV³QHJDWLYH
agenda control´) through a veto. From our perspective, governments with relatively few seats 
will primarily protect the status quo, increasing agenda stability. This logic implies a parabolic 
effect of seat shares. Governments with less than a majority of seats will experience greater 
stability or more difficulty changing laws that persists throughout their tenure in office (Laver 
1999). This leads us to the following clarification of our second hypothesis (where we expect no 
differences for minority governments in transition or non-transition years). 
 
 H2b) A government controlling a smaller percentage of seats (less than a majority) 
increases agenda stability.  
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Studies of parliamentary procedure emphasize timing (Huber 1996). The electoral cycle 
incentivizes parties to address issues at varying points between elections to appear accountable 
(e.g. Carey 2009). From this perspective, new governments prioritize electoral priorities and easy 
compromises before turning to more complicated policies (Greene 2016b). New governments 
following a partisan transition will seek to pass legislation consistent with their priorities. 
However, the extent that a new government can initiate reforms depends on its relative seat 
strength. Larger majorities require fewer negotiations to change policy, whereas governments 
with smaller delegations will be more at the mercy of individual MPs or factions. Governments 
with smaller delegations require greater time to initiate necessary policy bargains between 
groups to pass legislation, while governments with larger delegations can quickly change policy 
following a transition, reducing agenda stability. This logic leads us to hypothesize that a 
partisan transition moderates the effect of the sizHRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VVHDWVKDUHRQDJHQGD
stability.  
 
H2c)  A government with a larger percentage of seats decreases agenda stability 
following a partisan transition. 
 
Multiparty coalitions also structure policymaking. Relative to single party majorities, 
coalition governance complicates and constrains partisan influence; parties negotiate policy 
outcomes both within their own parties and with coalition partners (Warwick 1994; Tsebelis 
2002; Martin and Vanberg 2011). Parties unconstrained by coalition partners exert strong, 
positive control RISDUOLDPHQW¶VYRWLQJEHKDYLRU (Döring 2003). In this context, parties primarily 
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IDFHFRQVWUDLQWVLPSRVHGE\WKHSDUW\¶VRZQDELOLW\WRPDLQWDLQXQLW\LQSDUOLDPHQWDU\YRWHVThis 
leads to the following prediction; 
 
H3a) Single party governments lead to less agenda stability than coalition governments.   
 
However, multiparty coalitions also contain diverse interests. Coalitions with distinct 
partisan constituencies must enact policies to maintain each SDUW\¶s support. Cabinet positions 
linked to distinct issue jurisdictions structure coalition negotiations (Laver and Shepsle 1996). 
This implies that coalitions face greater challenges to altering the policy agenda. The number of 
coalition partners matters as well as how those parties prioritize issues (e.g. Bäck et al. 2011). 
Coalitions containing parties with a range of preferences must use logrolls across diverse issues 
to initiate policy change. Without compromises, coalitions end sooner than those capable of 
negotiating across issues (Warwick 1994; Greene 2016b). A greater number of parties increase 
the range of policy. Furthermore, from a principal-agent perspective, multiple parties enable the 
executive to treat parties as competing principals (Carey 2009).iv From this viewpoint, the 
executive uses different intra-coalition groups to construct support for their most preferred 
legislaWLRQE\RIIHULQJSROLF\FKDQJHVRQRWKHULVVXHVDVSD\PHQWIRUWKHSDUWLHV¶VXSSRUW This 
implies that across issues, the effect of negative agenda control dissolves when coalitions contain 
a greater number of parties.  
 
H3b) Coalitions with more parties have a less stable agenda. 
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The degree of partisan transition becomes complicated in parliaments featuring 
coalitions. For example, if a two party coalition forms following an election in which only one of 
the parties changes, previous research has struggled to identify a method to study such 
transitions. Following studies of portfolio allocation and gRYHUQPHQWIRUPDWLRQ%नFNHWDO
2011), we add that changes in the relative cabinet VHDWVKDUHRISDUWLHVLQGLFDWHVWKHFRDOLWLRQ¶V
originality. This implies that even if the same parties were included within a coalition following 
an election, changes in the relative percentage of seats each party contributes to the coalition 
LQIOXHQFHVWKHH[WHQWRIWKHWUDQVLWLRQEHWZHHQFRDOLWLRQV$PDMRUUHYHUVDOLQSDUWLHV¶IRUWXQHV
changes the negotiated policies the government pursues. We theorize that transitions are not 
always dichotomous, but smaller shifts in coalition composition represent an important, but 
slighter transition than a wholesale change. 
,QVXPPDU\ZHK\SRWKHVL]HWKDWSDUWLHV¶FRQWH[WDQGFKDUDFWHULVWLFVFRQVWUXFWWKHSROLF\
agenda. Economic condiWLRQVFRQVWUXFWJRYHUQLQJSDUWLHV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIIXWXUHHOHFWRUDO
success. Governments with a large percentage of seats quickly and easily adjust policy, whereas 
smaller majorities struggle to enact policies without substantial logrolls. Minority governments, 
incapable of altering the status quo, maintain a stable agenda. Single party governments are less 
stable than coalitions, but coalitions with more parties are less stable than those with fewer 
parties. Finally, transitions in governing parties lead to changes in the agenda; new parties shift 
WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDWWHQWLRQEXWWKHGHJUHHRIchange depends on the extent of the partisan 
transition.  
 
Data and Methods 
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 To test our hypotheses on partisan influence we use data on primary legislation from 
parliaments in countries included in the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP). We focus analyses 
on Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom (UK);v multi-
party systems in parliamentary democracies. Our cases range from majoritarian systems (UK) to 
more consensus based systems (Denmark). We use this data for the longest available period for 
each country from 1960 (to match our economic data) to 2008.vi 
 We operationalize our dependent variable, agenda stability,vii using primary legislation 
from each country. Based on the CAP major topic coding system, we measure agenda stability as 
the difference in issue attention for each country across issues from year to year (Mortensen et. 
al. 2011). We use the following formula to calculate the dependent variable:  
 
 
(1) 
 
Leg equals the percentage of primary legislation on an issue at time, t, and time, t-1, with 
the absolute value of the difference summed over all possible issues in the agenda (n). This value 
is divided by 2; as the maximum value is equal to 200 and the minimum value is 0 and is 
subtracted from 100. Agenda stability (AS) is highest at 100 and lowest at 0. Therefore, our 
dependent variable accounts for how attention changes across the range of issues between years. 
For example, if a government distributes policies identically in year, t, and year, t-1, then the 
agenda stability measure equals 100. However, if a government addresses a completely different 
set of issues in the second year, then our dependent variable equals 0. The measure accounts for 
relative change in the percentage of laws on each topic between years, rather than the total 
number of laws allowing us to determine whether parties make major changes in the substantive 
distribution of policy.  
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 Figure 1 presents our agenda stability measure for the six countries.   
[Figure 1 about here] 
 Figure 1 offers several insights into agenda-stability. In particular, constant agenda 
stability within and across countries is far from the norm. Policies generally change from year to 
year. The exception is Denmark in the early 1970s where a minority government exhibited 
perfect stability as it was unable to produce any legislation for a period of time. A comparison of 
the average level of agenda stability for majority governments of the UK and Spain to other 
countries also demonstrates that single party governments tend to have lower levels of agenda 
stability. 
To test our hypotheses, we make use of an autoregressive distributed lag model of agenda 
stability. In particular, we conduct time series cross-sectional analyses with panel corrected 
standard errors of agenda stability.viii We focus on pooled analyses because our hypotheses 
include general statements concerning coalitions, government transitions and parties that we 
expect to hold across the range of countries. The analyses include a lagged dependent variable 
(agenda stabilityt-1) to account for the autoregressive nature of agenda stability as evidenced by 
each series¶ autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions.  
 
Independent Variables 
 
Our first independent variable captures the state of the economy in each country using 
World Bank data. Specifically, we employ a measure of the percentage GDP growth to capture 
the FRXQWU\¶Vlevel of economic prosperity. This approach avoids potential issues posed by 
economic measures often associated with specific parties, such as the relationship between 
rightwing parties and inflation (Hibbs 1977; Bevan and Greene 2016). We expect that poor GDP 
growth increases agenda-stability as parties focus on prescriptions for repairing the economy.  
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 Our second independent variable measures the strength of government control as the 
percentage of government seats. Data on government composition comes from the ParlGov 
dataset (Döring and Manow 2012). We include the percentage of seats for all members of a 
governing cabinet to address its relative parliamentary power. We predict that a smaller majority 
makes for a less stable government in the long run, unable to easily maintain a policy agenda as 
government leaders must LQGXFH03VWRVXSSRUWWKHSDUW\¶VSURSRVDOV:HLQFOXGHWKHVTXDUH
term for government seats to account for the parabolic effect; we predict greater stability for 
large majorities and small minority governments, but less stable small majorities. 
 We further measure the effective number of coalition parties (ENCP) in the governing 
cabinet to account for inter-party coalition negotiations.ix We assume that high ENCP, cabinets 
with more, equally sized parties, indicates a more complex and difficult to manage cabinet 
relative to single party governments. We hypothesize that ENCP lowers agenda stability.  
To account for transitions in government control, we develop a continuous transition 
variable. Our indicator follows a similar logic to the agenda stability measure indicating the 
extent to which the governing cabinet changes during a transition. This measure was constructed 
using the following formula: 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
In the cabinet transition formula, % c seats refers to the percentage of seats each party, p, 
contributes to the cabinet. We subtract the percentage seats from year, t, and, t-1, for each party 
and aggregate the absolute value of that change.x We then divide the total number by two so that 
the scale ranges from zero to one.   
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Our measure of transition therefore accounts for the amount of change in the distribution 
of parties in the governing cabinet from one year to the next. This allows for a partial transition 
when coalition partners change even between elections. In the case of a complete transition in 
partisan control such as the switch between the Tories and New Labour in the UK in 1997, the 
measure takes the maximum value of 1. Alternate measures based on various thresholds for 
change in government composition coded 1 when the threshold was passed and 0 otherwise 
produced the same general inferences, but also produced poorer fitting models.xi This 
operationalization allows us to measure cabinet similarity even when there has been no election 
or when there are only small changes in the distribution of cabinet seats following an election. 
We further include interactions of our transition variable with our economic, majority 
size, and ENCP variables. A strong economy also leads to a unique effect with a party transition 
leading to a higher level of agenda stability; new governments hesitate to offer a radical shift in 
policy when the economy is doing well. Governments with a large majority are more capable of 
immediately implementing their program following a transition. ENCP has a similar, but 
independent effect on agenda stability. As ENCP increases stability becomes harder to maintain, 
particularly following a transition where key policies of all members of the coalition are pushed 
through to build a functional government.  
 
 
Analyses 
 
 Table 1 lists the results of our pooled time series cross-sectional analyses for all six 
countries. We present models with and without interactions with our transition variable and with 
and without squared government seats.   
[Table 1 about here] 
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The results in Table 1 largely support our hypotheses across each of the three 
specifications. We focus our discussion on Model 3 as it represents the most complete 
specification. In particular, our first hypothesis predicts that positive economic conditions 
decrease agenda stability (H1a), but that the effect of the economy reverses during a transition 
(H1b). The coefficient for GDP growth rate is negative, but not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. However, the coefficient for economic conditions following a partisan 
transition is more informative. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for the 
interaction with Party Transition supports our prediction (H1b). When a party transition occurs 
under a strong economy the new government largely focuses on a similar policy agenda. 
Conversely, a poor economy leads new governments to drastically change the policy agenda.  
 We demonstrate this effect graphically in Figure 2.xii Strong economic growth leads new 
partisan governments to stable policy agendas following a transition. On the other hand, 
moderate or negative growth rates lead to greater instability. This finding supports a perspective 
in which new partisan governments address a weak or stagnant economy differently than the 
previous government. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 Our second set of hypotheses predict that majority governments controlling a larger 
percentage of seats have increased agenda stability because they control the legislative agenda 
(H2a), but that smaller minority governments will also have greater agenda stability because they  
struggle to change the policy agenda (H2b). Therefore, these hypotheses predict a parabolic 
relationship where approximately 50% government seats will be the least stable. We also predict 
that this relationship reverses for majority governments following a partisan transition (H2c).   
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 Table 1 provides evidence for support our second set of hypotheses on the percentage 
seats controlled by the governing cabinet. The coefficients for % Government Seats and its 
squared term are in the expected directions. The negative coefficient for the % Government Seats 
is strong and negative, whereas its square is positive, indicating that the effect of the variable 
reverses. This effect is similar when interacted with Party Transition, although the magnitude of 
change increases.   
We graph the predicted effect of the proportion seats when there is no transition and a 
complete transition in Figure 3.xiii The graphical evidence indicates that minority governments 
have more stable agendas than majority governments both in transition and non-transition years, 
but that as majority governments gain more seats, this effect reverses. As we predicted the effect 
is parabolic (H2a and H2b), although the predicted effects are not statistically different for 
majority governments because of the limited number of cases at the extremes. Furthermore, 
Figure 3 shows that in transition years, the effect of seat share actually leads to a more stable 
agenda than in non-transition years (counter to H2c), although the predicted effects are not quite 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Additional analyses presented in Table 1, 
excluding the transition interaction (Model 2), lead to stronger results in support of H2b, but the 
results do not quite reach statistical significance for majority governments. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
While we find only limited support for hypotheses on government seat shares, there is 
clearer evidence that the number of parties in government changes agenda stability. Consistent 
with H3a, the coefficient for Single Party Governments lead to less stable agendas than multi-
party governments, although the coefficient is only significant for transition years.  
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Also in line with our predictions, ENCP is negative and significant when interacted with 
Party Transition. A coalition containing greater ENCP changes the agenda more than coalitions 
with fewer parties (H3b). Much like the impact of single party governments, the effect of ENCP 
is only statistically significant in transition years. We demonstrate this effect graphically in 
Figure 4. Coalitions where one party controls nearly all of the seats (converging on ENCP=1), 
are more stable than coalitions containing a larger number of parties.xiv This evidence connects 
well with studies showing that coalitions initially deal with the easy compromises and then focus 
on protecting their accomplishments later on (Martin and Vanberg 2011; Greene 2016b). 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Conclusion 
 
 We argue that the constraints and incentives imposed on parties dictate issue attention in 
parliamentary governments. We find that parties often have large effects on the stability of 
government agendas. As studies of economic voting and party election strategy predict (Whitten 
and Palmer 1999; Hellwig 2012; Greene 2016a; Williams et al. 2016), this effect is not as simple 
as much of the analyses focused on party politics would suggest; government responsiveness to 
the economy, coalition size, and the number of coalition parties affect the ability to maintain a 
stable policy agenda. The results demonstrate their effect is greatest when there is some 
transition between the parties controlling the governing cabinet. Whereas previous studies failed 
to find much effect on specific policy outcomes, we show that the aggregate effect of partisan 
WUDQVLWLRQVGHSHQGVRQWKHIDFWRUVWKDWFKDQJHSDUWLHV¶DELOLW\DQGincentives for altering the 
policy agenda.  
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We find that the effect of party transitions on agenda stability come from a range of 
parliamentary governments. While we believe that these results are indicative of a broader trend 
across the democratic world, our sample limits our inferences about politics in contexts with 
weaker party discipline or greater numbers of institutionally designated veto players (e.g. the 
United States). However, we are confident that our perspective will travel well to alternate 
contexts, as many key theoretical concepts build on studies of government accountability and 
party politics in contexts with different institutional configurations (e.g. Carey 2009). Likewise, 
issue focused studies find evidence of partisan effects in various settings (e.g. Jensen and Spoon 
2011). 
Our results hold important implications for scholars of public policy, party government 
and our understanding of democratic politics. For those interested in studying a partisan effect, 
our results suggest that single party governments with small majorities facing strong economic 
growth are the most likely to radically shift policy during non-transition years. Furthermore, our 
theory suggests that intra-party factions play a meaningful role in policy-making. Our analysis 
complements evidence that the preferences of diverse groups of activists, MPs and party leaders 
often deviate at party congresses (Ceron 2015; Greene and Haber 2016) and in government 
(Huber 1996; Laver 1999; Carey 2009; Kam 2009). Intra-party variation in priorities, therefore, 
VKRXOGDOVRLQIOXHQFHWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRISDUWLHV¶DWWHQWLRQ0RUWHQVHQHWDO 
Public policy research has increasingly become interested in questions of partisan 
LQIOXHQFH:KLOHPXFKUHVHDUFKVKRZVWKDWSDUWLHV¶KDYHRQO\OLPLWHGLPSDFWVRQVSHFLILFSROLF\
outcomes, this study suggests that the lack of evidence for a partisan effect may be an artifact of 
coding decisions. OuUDSSURDFKVWULSVDZD\DVVXPSWLRQVDERXWWKHH[DFWGLIIHUHQFHVLQSDUWLHV¶
SROLF\SULRULWLHVEXWDFFRXQWVIRUSDUWLHV¶DQGJRYHUQPHQWV¶EURDGFKDUDFWHULVWLFV. We show 
21 
 
evidence of consistent change in the distribution of policy following partisan transitions and, 
importantly, between transitions as well. New partisans in government dedicate resources to 
build a different policy agenda than the preceding government. This effect is greatest when the 
resolve and ability to change policy is highest: under a weak economy and in single party 
governments. Unsurprisingly, once the transition is complete and a new government establishes 
an agenda, it becomes more stable.   
 Party politics research often focuses on detailed preferences and competitive situations, 
but it has only begun to extend these insights to government changes in issue attention. While the 
UHODWLYHORFDWLRQRISDUWLHV¶SUHIHUHQFHVLVLPSRUWDQWWKHSDUW\¶Vpolicy agenda and priorities are 
also important for political outcomes. Further research explaining when and why parties adopt 
policies in strategic contexts connects to research linking traditional issue competencies to 
behavior in office and bridge the divide between public policy and party politics research. 
Finally, we add that these results indicate that parties offer real substantive differences 
once they enter office. Even small transitions lead to changes in the policy agenda. While voters 
PD\EHXQDZDUHRISDUWLHV¶GHWDLOHGSROLF\JRDOVXVLQJVLPSOHKHXULVWLFVVXFKDVSDUW\ODEHOVDQG
economic conditions, our perspective suggests that citizens can form relatively sound 
H[SHFWDWLRQVRQSDUWLHV¶EHKDYLRUs in office. 
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NOTES
                                                          
i We refer to the policy DJHQGDDVWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRILVVXHVDGGUHVVHGLQSDUWLHV¶PDQLIHVWRVRU
government policy (Bevan et al. 2011). We refer to agenda-setting as the broad process of 
constraining which issues are attended to by government. This usage contrasts the more 
constraining definition used in studies of legislative behavior, which refers to the agenda as the 
structure and order of voting used to manipulate voting outcomes (Döring 2001). 
ii We define issue attention as the distribution of policies passed in a year across issues. 
iii Parties fear retribution for a weak economy. Governments appearing unconcerned with 
economic decline likely face even greater punishment (Green and Jennings 2012a; 2012b). A 
weak economy, therefore, leads to greater agenda stability because the government focuses 
policy attention on topics it believes improve the economy. 
iv This perspective complements a veto players approach.  While coalitions may contain multiple 
partisan agenda-setters (Tsebelis 2002), more parties increase the likelihood of ideologically 
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µFDSWXUHG¶SDUWLHV, but not the total number of effective partisan veto players. More parties, 
however, increase the number of demands across issues and allow the prime minister multiple 
routes to achieve policy.  
v *CAP: www.comprativeagendas.net 
*Canada: www.snsoroka.com/data.html.  
vi
 A pooled model (not presented here) only including the two longest series, the UK and 
Denmark, produces the same inferences.  
vii Our interest in agenda stability allows us to be neutral about the types of issues parties address 
to look for systematic change in the aggregate agenda. However, this work is related to research 
RQGLYHUVLW\RIWKDWDJHQGDDQGWKHWUDGHRIIEHWZHHQLVVXHVXVLQJ6KDQQRQ¶V+-Hnnings et al. 
2011; Boydstun et al. 2014; Greene 2016a). Nevertheless, the measures only weakly correlate 
(0.39). 
viii As a robustness check the analyses were also run using a fractional logit model to account for 
DJHQGDVWDELOLW\¶VERXQGLQJEHWZHHQDQG. These results produced the same inferences. 
ix :HXVH6KDQQRQ¶V+WRFRQVWUXFWENCP. Our results are similar using a measure based on the 
Herfindahl index, although predictably t it GRHVQRWSHUIRUPDVZHOODVWKH6KDQQRQ¶V+7KH
coefficients are in the same direction, although they barely drop below standard levels of 
significance for the Herfindahl. The overall model fit decreases as indicated by the adjusted R 
squared.  
x In rare cases with multiple transitions in the same year, we use the value for the longest serving 
cabinet in that year.    
xi Analyses of the effect of both pre- and post-election dummy variables as possible alternative 
measures led to poorer fitting models. 
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xii We hold each of the primary independent variables at their mean values in Figure 2, varying 
GDP growth from its minimum to its maximum observed values for observations following 
transitions. 95% Confidence Intervals are simulated from 1000 draws of the variance covariance 
matrix based on Model 3. The dashes across the bottom show the distribution of observations. 
This same approach is used for Figures 3 and 4. 
xiii :DOGWHVWVRIWKHFRHIILFLHQWV¶MRLQWVLJQLILFDQFHLQGLFDWHVWKDWWKHHIIHFWRIFRDOLWLRQVL]HLV
statistically different from zero at the 95% level during transitions and 99% level during non-
transition years.  
xiv Models excluding the single party government variable with a parabolic ENCP variable lead 
to similar results. Both single party governments and coalitions with more parties have decreased 
stability relative to coalitions with only a small number of parties.  
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Table 1: Time Series Cross-Sectional Analyses of Agenda Stability 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
GDP Growth Rateit 0.363+ -0.005 -0.031 
 (0.193) (0.227) (0.231) 
% Government Seatsit -9.481** -60.396*** -40.990+ 
 (2.897) (17.421) (21.879) 
% Government Seats2it  48.557** 31.467 
  (16.915) (21.048) 
ENCPit -0.401 0.130 0.110 
 (0.756) (0.913) (0.907) 
Single Party Governmentit -3.137* -1.897 -2.042 
 (1.266) (1.395) (1.386) 
Party Transitionit -1.403 5.206 18.883+ 
 (1.231) (7.108) (11.000) 
GDP Growth Rateit X Party Transitionit  2.853*** 2.931*** 
  (0.717) (0.725) 
ENCPit X Party Transitionit  -4.994+ -5.176+ 
  (3.025) (3.058) 
Single Party Governmentit X Party 
Transitionit 
 -10.548* -10.979* 
  (5.148) (5.243) 
% Government Seatsit X Party Transitionit   -48.667 
   (34.211) 
% Government Seats2it X Party Transitionit   41.598 
   (35.557) 
Lagged DV: Agenda Stabilityit-1 0.555*** 0.557*** 0.561*** 
 (0.059) (0.062) (0.063) 
Constant 41.156*** 53.266*** 47.816*** 
 (5.648) (7.776) (8.656) 
R2 0.434 0.495 0.499 
Root Mean Squared Error 6.236 5.949 5.957 
Observations 206 206 206 
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Panel Corrected Standard Errors are presented 
in parentheses.  
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Figure 1: Agenda Stability by Country 
Over Time 
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Figure 2. Effect of the Economy on 
Agenda Stability Following a Party 
Transition 
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Figure 3. Effect of Coalition Seat Share 
on Agenda Stability 
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Figure 4. Effect of ENCP on Agenda 
Stability Following a Party Transition 
7
0
8
0
9
0
1
0
0
1 2 3
Effective Number of Cabinet Parties
 
 
 
